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No question is more important in Britain 
today than that of industrial democracy. 
More and more people ai'e keenly discussing 
the issue which quite recently was of concern 
only to the smallest minority. In the next 
year or so, it is perfectly possible that general 
elections will be fought in order to decide 
upon proposals for the democratisation of 
work. With the British economy stumbling 
from one crisis to another it is becoming 
plain that autocratic management is no 
longer adequate to solve our economic 
problems. Improvements in education and 
trade union organisation have made workers 
impatient of petty dictatorship in their place 
of employment. Something has got to 
change.
In the words of the miners’ leader, William 
Straker: “ In the past workmen have thought 
that if they could secure higher wages and 
better conditions they would be content .... 
Employers have thought that if they granted 
these things the workers ought to be content. 
Wages and conditions have been improved; 
but the discontent and the unrest have not 
disappeared, and many good people have 
come to the conclusion that working men are 
so unreasonable that it is useless trying to 
satisfy them. The fact is that the unrest is 
deeper than can be reached by merely 
pounds, shillings and pence, necessary as
they are. The root of the matter is the 
straining of the spirit of man to be free.
Once he secures the freedom of the spirit he 
will, as a natural sequence, secure a material 
welfare equal to what the united brains and 
hand can wring from mother earth and her 
surrounding atmosphere...”  (The worker 
must not be left) ... “ ... in the position of a 
mere wage earner, whose sole energies are 
directed by the will of another. He must have 
a share in the management of the industry in 
which he is engaged, and understand all 
about the purpose and destination of the 
product he is producing; he must know both 
the productive and the commercial side of the 
industry. He must feel that the industry is 
being run by him in order to produce coal for 
the use of the community, instead of profit for 
a few people.”
As working people and their organisations 
have increasingly given their support to this 
point of view, so the authorities have had to 
take notice. In the Labour Party and the 
trade unions, the intense debate on 
industrial democracy came to a head during 
the two years before the re-election of the 
Labour Government in 1974. As a result of 
strong pressures, in 1975 Mr. Wilson 
appointed the Bullock Committee to look into 
some of the relevant problems. It is necessary 
to examine how far Lord Bullock’s team have
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understood the demand that democracy 
should not stop at the factory gate, and to 
attempt to assess how much use the 
Committee’s proposals might be to trade 
unionists in their search for more power over 
the work place.
1. The Background.
After the victory of the “ yes” lobby in the 
referendum on the Common Market, early in 
1975, the Wilson administration took a sharp 
turn away from the course of its manifesto 
and the interests of its supporters. Mr Joe 
Haines, who was the press secretary of Sir 
Harold Wilson between January 1969 and 
April 1976, recently scandalised far more of 
the British establishment than the small 
proportion of it which still votes Labour, 
when he published a sensational account of 
the day-to-day activity of the “ kitchen 
cabinet” which surrounded the Prime 
Minister. If Mr Haines is not inaccurate in 
his story of the origins of current pay 
policies, the pressures on the trade unions 
began with an artificial run on the pound 
stimulated by the Treasury, whether with or 
without prime ministerial approval.
At the same time, a Governmental 
reshuffle ditched certain ministers and 
removed the main advocate of industrial 
democracy within the Government, Tony 
Benn, from the Industry Department. The 
Industry Act which he had brought before 
Parliament was neutered by removing all 
compulsion on employees to conclude 
planning agreements. Demands for new 
worker co-operatives which had been 
stimulated by the experiments at Meriden, 
Fisher-Bendix (KME) and the Scottish Daily 
News, were discouraged by allowing the 
factory occupation at Imperial Typewriters 
in Hull to sink unaided and that at Norton 
Villiers Triumph to drag on over many 
months.
An important part of this dispiriting drift 
of affairs was the announcement by trade 
secretary Peter Shore in the House of 
Commons on Augusts, 1975, of the intention 
to appoint a committee o f enquiry 
“ Accepting the need for a radical extension 
of industrial democracy in the control of 
companies by means of representation on 
boards of directors, and accepting the 
essential role of trade union organisations in 
this process, to consider how such an 
extension can best be achieved, taking into
account in particular the proposals of the 
Trades Union Congress report on industrial 
democracy as well as experiences in Britain, 
the EEC and other countries, having regard 
to the interest of the national economy, 
employees, investors and consumers, to 
a n a lyse  the im p lica t ion s  o f  such 
representation for the efficient management 
of companies and for company law.”
When the personnel of this committee were 
finally appointed, under the chairmanship of 
Lord Bullock, and announced, four months 
later, we wrote in the Bulletin of the Institute 
for Workers’ Control:
“ The October 1974 Election Manifesto, 
upon which the present Government 
returned to office, contained an explicit 
pledge to honour the decisions previously 
reached in a series o f Labour Party 
Conferences. ‘We will’ , it said, ‘introduce new 
legislation to help forward our plans for a 
radical extension of industrial democracy in 
both the private and public sectors. This will 
involve major changes in company law and 
in the statutes which govern the nationalised 
industries and the public services.’
Already in February 1974, the previous 
Manifesto had pledged ‘We intend to 
socialise the nationalised industries. In 
consultation with the unions, we shall take 
steps to make the management of existing 
nationalised industries more responsible to 
the workers in the industry and more 
responsive to their consumers’ needs.’
This is the context in which the newly 
appointed Commission on Industrial 
Democracy had begun to work. Charged to 
report within a year, and seeking written 
evidence before March, it seems to be in a 
hurry, and this could be taken as an earnest 
that legislation is intended during the 
current Parliament. No doubt that 
impression was intended: but it would be 
naive to accept that it accords with the likely 
future.
“ Commissions of Enquiry, in the given 
political system, can be set up wherever there 
are technical com plexities requiring 
legislative treatment, or, alternatively where 
contentious issues need resolution. In this 
second case, the function of a Commission 
may be to resolve antagonistic interests, or to 
simply provide an excuse to delay. Miners, 
for instance, still remember the post-first-
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world-war Sankey Commission with great 
bitterness, as Lloyd George’s escape route 
from the nationalisation of the mines. Is 
Lord Bullock another Sankey? It looks very 
much like it. Although Jack Jones, Clive 
Jenkins and David Lea (the draftsman of the 
TUC’s programme for industrial democracy) 
are included among his committee’s 
members, so too is the Director-designate of 
the Confederation of British Industry, whose 
views are known to differ greatly from the 
TUC’s. Two independents (one of whom, Bill 
Wedderburn) is likely to sympathise with 
proposals along the TUC lines, while the 
other, George Bain, is not yet publicly on the 
record) will not suffice to tilt the balance even 
for TUC-style majority report. So it appears 
that the intention behind the establishment 
of the Commission is either to secure a 
dilution of the TUC’s proposals, or a 
confusion of Reports, which might serve as 
an excuse for still further delay.”
Now, with the publication of the Report in 
January 1977, we are able to begin to 
evaluate the results of all these pressures.
First, it is clear that the trade union 
contingent on the committee have put up a 
strong defence o f the idea o f joint 
determination. They have advanced some 
technically sophisticated proposals, which, 
were they to be introduced tomorrow, would 
undoubtedly strengthen union powers. The 
majority report, embodying these ideas, has 
provoked a veritable deluge of protests from 
employers, and the opposition has 
announced its intransigent and complete 
rejection of it. The Government has not 
promised to implement. Key ministers have 
p u b lic ly  announced  w illin gn ess  to 
“negotiate” about it.
Even so, the original TUC commitment to 
an extension of collective bargaining into the 
boardroom has already, in fact, been 
modified, sometimes by rather bold and 
attractive suggestions but at other points 
by dilutions of the initial intentions. That the 
Report is very much more favourable to the 
unions than it might have been is completely 
obvious from the frenzied comments upon it 
by industrialists and newspapers. At the 
same time, the reaching of agreement among 
a majority of the committee’s members has 
cost a number of concessions. Obviously it is 
important for the discussion on workers’ 
control to focus attention on the questions,
how far is “joint determination” compatible 
with workers’ control, how far do the two 
concepts travel together and at what points 
do they separate?
My own view on this matter is simply 
explained. Workers’ control is not an 
ultimate aim which would, for a true 
industrial democrat, properly be a self­
managed society of producer associations, 
without private industrial ownership except 
at the level of individual initiative (self- 
employment). “ Control” means supervision, 
regulation, superintendence: and “ workers’ 
control” is sensibly seen as that transitional 
phase which opens when workers begin to 
get the upper hand, and consolidate their 
powers of representation, accountability and 
veto over irresponsible management 
prerogatives. Workers’ control could well 
begin to assert itself through the effective 
extension of collective bargaining into that 
complex of decision areas defined by the 
TUC as relevant to a union invasion of the 
boardroom, if this were based on strict parity 
of numbers, and if we were presuming block 
voting on all major issues with lay member 
control over all elected representatives.
Workers’ control does not imply that 
worker representatives should take 
responsibility for management decisions, 
but it rigorously implies the contrary, that 
management be brought into conformity 
with workers’ interests. If workers’ control is 
established, it will tend to lead to further 
demands for full self-management in which 
work-collectives become genuinely self- 
governing, and professions, whether 
managerial or technical, are hired by the 
collective to work under its direction.
Study of this report will quickly reveal that 
“joint determination” is seen by its authors 
as a much more modest objective.
The Bullock Committee insists that there 
is no viable basis for worker participation in 
management boards other than that of 
parity. Yet the Committee has recommended 
that, alongside equal representation of trade 
union and shareholder nominees, there 
shou ld  be appointed  to boards an 
intermediary group jointly agreed between 
the two other factions. This formula has 
become known as 2x + y. It signifies equal 
numbers of shareholders’ and workers’ 
representatives with a smaller number of
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agreed intermediaries. O f course, the 
Committee recognises that it might not be 
easy to agree about the intermediary group 
and accordingly a provision has been made 
for the government to appoint a special 
commission, with the power to resolve all 
disputes which arise by making its own 
nominations.
The argument for parity is central to the 
original TUC proposals on industrial 
democracy which emerged through various 
drafts which were initially provoked in 
reaction against the EEC’s draft fifth 
directive. (Reporting on European unions’ 
attitude to co-determination, the Congress 
document Industrial D em ocracy had 
pointed out that the Austrian government 
had recently been persuaded to raise 
employee representation on large company 
boards to 50 per cent. The Bullock Committee 
did not visit Austria, but it did visit 
Scandinavia and Germany where minority 
employee participation on boards has been 
the dominant form of involvement in 
company structure.) The TUC document 
favors employee representation on British 
boards, recommending that “ one half of the 
supervisory board should be appointed by 
the workpeople, through trade union
machinery” . When the issue was debated in 
Congress, the motion in question, which was 
approved, said:
“ Congress .... requires that any extension 
of trade union participation in industrial 
management shall be, and be seen to be, an 
extension of collective bargaining and shall 
in no sense compromise the unions’ role as 
here defined.”
Bargaining does not normally take place 
in conditions where intermediaries might 
determine the outcome. In that debate, Len 
Murray insisted:
“ The General Council see nothing in the 
terms of Composite Motion 17 which is in 
opposition to their Report.”
Winding up the discussion on these 
matters, Len Murray further told Congress:
“ Reference has been made to supervisory 
boards and co-determination in Germany .... 
There was a great philosopher .... who 
emphasised the need to stand Hegel on his 
feet. Well, we have stood the German 
conception .... on its feet.”
It is important to recall that the TUC 
proposals differed from the German 
conception in eliminating works councils, 
insisting on trade union appointment of all 
worker representatives to boards and 
claiming parity. This was the policy for 
which Congress voted, and it might be 
argued that its essentials should not be 
negotiable. Collective bargaining can enter 
the boardroom, imposing a significant shift 
in the balance of power in industry, and 
experimenting with “ management by 
consent” : but this will happen only if the 
lines are kept clear, and the worker 
representatives remain strictly accountable. 
If it is thought that the extension of 
bargaining should be restricted to particular 
issues (closures, mergers, investment 
decisions, takeovers, etcetera) then it might 
indeed be better to preserve parity on a 
supervisory board with those specific powers 
than to yield it to a single tier structure 
without parity. (This, after all, is Congress 
policy, and Lord Bullock is not an elected 
member of any Congress governing body.)
The underlying reason for this policy is 
perfectly clear. Bargaining takes place 
between two sides. If trade unions are 
henceforth to negotiate at board level
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because the procedures are to be changed in 
order to extend collective bargaining it is 
apparent that neither side must be allowed to 
“ outvote” the other. The purpose of board- 
level representation of trade unionists is to 
impose prior consultation upon crucial 
matters, to change the climate of decision- 
taking by extending the principle of ‘status 
quo’ from the shop floor to major policy 
questions and to reach agreements wherever 
reasonably possible. All these purposes are 
consonant with the “ extension of collective 
bargaining” . Anything else is not. This 
means that “ votes” will normally be either 
100 per cent or 50-50: agreement, or failure to 
agree.
It could, of course, be argued that such a 
strong possibility of deadlock implies the 
need for appropriate mechanisms of conflict 
resolution. There would be no objection to 
these provided they had no mandatory 
powers. Union representatives might 
welcome the choice between arbitration and 
industrial action: however, they should not 
be bound to accept the ruling of any umpire. 
Neither should they be “pushed” by the 
existence of an arbitration system which 
could abbreviate bargaining in the 
employers’ interest: so all recourse to such 
mediation should be strictly voluntary.
The Report is persuasive concerning the 
lim ita tion s  o f  m in ority  em ployee 
participation, and argues strongly for equal 
involvement of workers and shareholders. It 
cites the German experience of parity 
representation in coal and steel industries as 
being more effective than the minority 
representation which prevails elsewhere in 
German industry. The same Biedenkopf 
Commission which reported this reaction, 
however, also reported regular bloc voting by 
the “ two sides” in coal and steel, which the 
Report sees as a regrettable tendency, to be 
reduced. We would see it as intensely 
regrettable if anything else were to happen in 
the discussion of major issues since this 
w ou ld  im p ly  the  b r e a k d o w n  o f  
representation, and the replacement of 
collective bargaining by something else. Of 
course, any joint board would have certain 
consultative functions in which discussion 
might easily cut across block lines on lesser 
matters. But where the work people’s vital 
interests were at stake, we would see no 
virtue in worker representation which failed 
to defend them.
It is in this context that the “ y” component 
must be evaluated. We can dismiss as 
ideological the notion that three or five 
outsiders can save a collective from 
“ company egoism” . Planning Agreements, 
already possible under the Industry Act, 
might offer a way to do this, but the 
government has shown no will to enforce its 
legislation on this important matter. There 
seems no advantage to labor in the 
appointment to boards o f  “ solicitors, 
bankers, accountants” , or “ former non­
executive directors”  or even “ senior 
personnel from other companies” . Sadly, 
workpeople are not convinced that external 
appointments of union officers are always 
relevant, either. When a leader of the Boot 
and Shoe Union entered the National Coal 
Board (to say nothing of a former USD AW 
official) the prospects of miners were not 
transformed, or at any rate not transformed 
for the better.
The report specifically insists that the “y” 
group should have no obligation to be 
neutral. Yet, in Chapter II, it reveals that it 
would take a very dim view of them being 
biased towards the workers:
“ 33. We considered a further problem. It 
arises where the boards of a holding 
company and of a large subsidiary company 
have both been reconstituted on a 2x + y 
basis. The board of the holding company has 
the power to appoint the shareholders’ 
representatives on the subsidiary board. It 
might be argued that, if the law made no 
further provision, the board of the subsidiary 
might eventually come to contain a majority 
o f d irectors who in p ra ctice  were 
representatives of the employees. It is said 
that this could occur in the following way: if 
the employee representatives on the holding 
company board secured the agreement of the 
majority of the co-opted directors on that 
board they might ensure that one or more of 
the persons appointed to the board of the 
subsidiary as representatives o f the 
shareholder (i.e. the holding company) would 
in reality represent the employees. For 
example, it is said that the holding 
company’s employee representatives might 
persuade the co-opted directors that the 
holding company should appoint one of their 
own num ber to be a ‘ sh areh older 
representative’ on the subsidiary board. 
Such a person might then vote with the 
employee representatives on the subsidiary
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board and form with them a majority to co­
opt directors to the subsidiary board who 
were really acceptable to employees’ 
interests only. This would produce the result 
that the subsidiary board contained in 
practice a majority of directors who were 
effectively representatives of employees, 
even though at least one of them posed as a 
h o ld in g  c o m p a n y ’ s ‘ s h a r e h o ld e r  
representative’.
“ 34. Weregard any such sequence of events 
as highly unlikely; and we are confident that 
employee representatives on a holding 
company board would not normally consider 
acting in this way or, if they did, that the co­
opted directors on that board would not agree 
to their plan. Even so, we do not wish our 
proposals to be open to this criticism, 
however theoretical it may be. For it is no 
p a r t  o f  o u r  i n t e n t i o n  to  m a k e  
recommendations which could possibly 
produce such a result.”
The likelihood o f this “ difficulty” 
happening would be small indeed, since, 
contrary to the assumptions of the Report, if 
both sides are loyal to their constituents, 
they will almost certainly need the services 
of the Industrial Democracy Commission to 
arrive at the final composition of the “y” 
grouping. Who might comprise the 
membership of such a commission? This 
becomes a key matter which poses a question 
of confidence in those appointing it. Who is 
lik e ly  to doubt th at the present 
administration would feel compelled to 
appoint a Commission acceptable to 
employer/shareholders opinion? This would 
mean that the composition of all boards 
would not be 2x + y, but x (shareholders’ 
reps.) + y over x (workers’ reps.).
The rest of the Report’s recommendations 
concerning the paying-off of unwanted 
shareholder directors, and the time-scale 
implementation, insofar as this is separable 
from the impermissible “ y” component, are 
unexceptionable. With the retention of the 
“y” element, however, the presence of 
redundant d irectors  who m ust be 
compensated might well be utilised as an 
argument for their co-option, on grounds of 
economy, as the Report argues. This can 
hardly be regarded as desirable.
Many trade unionists, and a number' of 
socialist Members of Parliament have 
strongly criticised the 2x + y formula along
these lines. However, the Report contains a 
good deal more than this recommendation, 
and its overall impact has provoked a 
powerful reaction from the employers. It is 
clear that for them the whole thing is very 
nasty.
The Confederation of British Industry has 
identified three “ sticking points” , all three of 
which must be removed, before they will co­
operate. For them, there must be no 
legislation to put union directors on 
company boards; no parity between the two 
sides; and no trade union monopoly in the 
process o f  n om in ation . They have 
threatened to withdraw from the so-called 
“ industrial strategy” working parties of the 
National Economic Development Council if 
their views are not met although it must be 
said that the collapse of these bodies would 
injure no one but the transnational sector 
leaders whose interests dominate both the 
forty  w ork in g  parties w hich  have 
determined sectoral policy, and a sizeable 
chunk of the policies of the CBI itself. The 
government could certainly afford to let such 
industrialists amputate their own noses in 
order to improve their unacceptable faces: 
although it shows no signs whatever of 
wishing to do so. It is obvious from the 
hullabaloo which Bullock has stirred up that 
directors in general do not wish to declare 
themselves redundant, or to move over to 
make room in board meetings for other 
interests than their own, however limited the 
powers of those interests might be.
This reaction was echoed, with some 
number of added decibels, in the newspapers. 
The Sunday Times produced a mock 
minute from an imaginary directors’ 
meeting in 1980, showing that because two of 
the three “ y” directors proved to have 
liberally weak knees, the board was totally 
boxed, and unable to go ahead with a South 
African take-over or a generous dividend 
handout. My own imaginary scenario would 
unfortunately, look very different: but then I 
w ou ld  n o t  fo l lo w  The T i m e s  in 
characterising the Report as a “ disaster” , 
gorging “ the trade unions with power, like a 
S trasbou rg  g o o s e ” . In a lim it«d  
acquaintance with such birds, I had formed 
the conclusion that power was almost the 
only thing that was not crammed into their 
throats, and that their fate was consequently 
such as would, if visited upon the trade 
unions, socialists in the Labor Party, or
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other immoderate folk, be quite likely to 
delight the editor of The Times if only, alas, 
in reverie.
With such wild reactions to a set of very 
modest proposals, trade unionists will feel 
the need to draw up their own evaluation of 
them. Here is a possible balance sheet:
1. Favorable proposals from  a trade 
union standpoint:
a. The Report contains a number of careful 
arguments against the “ divine right” of 
shareholders’ nominees to determine 
industrial policy. Some of these arguments 
could be put to a more radical purpose than 
that advocated in the Report itself.
b. The Report does recognise that industrial 
autocracy will no longer pass unchallenged, 
and that there are serious pressures for 
change.
c. The Report rejects proposals for two-tier 
structures with a “ supervisory board” . There 
are some good things in this, some bad.
d. Many of the specific arguments against 
reform, pressed by company spokesmen 
during the submission of evidence, are 
convincingly answered in the Report.
e. Verbal concessions are made to the TUC 
insistence upon the extension of collective 
bargaining as the key principle of 
democratic advance.
f. The Report does recommend proposals 
which could only begin to work effectively in 
the context of a striking advance in trade 
union organisation at Combine level. 
Currently this is opposed by management 
w hich  seldom  recogn ises  com bin e 
committees as bargaining agents; and by 
some trade unions, which fear the 
concentrations of power which might arise, 
to the imagined detriment of executive 
authority. Quite clearly this is the major 
beneficial recommendation featured in the 
Report.
g. The Report rejects demands for 
“ consumer” representation which could only 
confuse the issue to the disadvantage of both 
workers and consumers. Consumer interests 
must be safeguarded by better organisation, 
adequate reporting, action against dishonest 
advertising and wider public disclosure of 
commercial secrets.
h. The proposals for Joint Representation
C om m ittees to ap p o in t em ployee 
representatives are carefully considered and 
sensible. They reinforce point f, above.
1. The Report rightly insists that worker 
representatives should not receive directors’ 
fees. It rightly makes certain provisions for 
the recall of representatives by their 
constituents.
j. The Report rightly opposes exemptions for 
special categories of enterprises (banking, 
sh ip p in g , the press, e tc .); or for 
multinationals. It rightly rules that the 
eligibility of holding companies for the 
reform should be measured against the sum 
of the employed labor force o f all 
subsidiaries.
k. The Report will arouse discussion.
2. U nfavorable proposals.
a The 2x + y formula is in itself objectionable.
It virtually guarantees the hostility of a 
majority of board members to labor interests 
at key times in all cases, and always in those 
cases where multinationals and subsidiary 
companies are involved. This is blatantly the 
case when a subsidiary triggers the 
proposals while the holding company 
remains unaffected. The Report itself 
contains many arguments for parity, but it 
has attempted to pass over these by the use of 
misleading algebraic formulae.
b. The initial requirement that companies 
employ 2,000 plus workers is too high. Most 
workers are excluded by it.
c. The provisions for accountability are too 
fuzzy, and at crucial instances, harmful. 
Worker representatives in a parity 
committee should be strictly accountable at 
all times, and even the experiment of 
complete parity would be hazardous if this 
were not laid down with absolute sharpness 
from the beginning.
d. Collective bargaining will not be possible 
in the established sense of the term, when 
hostile intermediaries are present with votes. 
This means that the Report opposes a 
specific TUC resolution -
“ Congress .... requires that any extension 
of trade union participation in industrial 
management shall be, and be seen to be, an 
extension of collective bargaining and shall 
in no sense compromise the unions’ role as 
here defined.”
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e. The difficulties o f single-channel 
representation, supervisory boards, and 
sim ila r  qu estion s require further 
consideration.
It will be seen that the list of objections is a 
short one, while the list of advantages is a 
long one. Unfortunately, the items do not 
weigh equally. Four out of the five objections 
are absolutely crucial, and require the actual 
gutting of Bullock’s proposals before they 
can be brought into line with the basic 
commitments of the TUC.
There is a further objection to Bullock: as it 
stands, it is not going to be implemented. On 
the contrary, all its disadvantages are about 
to be systematically enlarged, and all its 
advantages reduced.
The newspaper clamor, and the taciturn 
noises of Lord Watkinson, joined with 
predictable menaces from the Conservative 
front bench, have persuaded several dozen 
Labor parliamentarians that the defence of 
Bullock is a worthy occupation. No doubt 
there is a lingering feeling in the country 
which will support this view, since, 
disappointed as they are with the 
governm ent’s performance in raising 
unemployment, cutting back on public and 
welfare spending, and putting aside their 
own election program, there exist large 
number of Labor supporters who have not 
yet learned to love the boss, or believe every 
last word that is printed in the press. Of 
course, trade unionists have every reason to 
fear that the government will run away from 
the implementation of its pledges on 
industrial democracy, and the observations 
of Mr. Edmund Dell on the Bullock Report 
itself reveal this process to be already far 
advanced. Speaking to the Society for Long- 
Range Planning, the Trade Secretary said:
“ I think it will be widely agreed that 
management must not be hindered in its 
efforts to achieve success for the company.
Companies are not social clubs .... we in the 
government have already made it clear that 
we do not wish to legislate under threat of 
repeal.”
Does this mean that no white paper will 
ever appear after Bullock, or that no bill will 
ever follow such a white paper? I think not. 
All the evidence appears to indicate that 
industrial democracy is part way embarked 
on a long downward escalator. At the top, on 
stable ground, stood yesterday’s TUC policy, 
based on parity representation. A good way 
down, today, we see Bullock fidgeting with 
all the complexities of 2x + y. Tomorrow, or 
more likely a little later, in the white paper, 
we shall be offered a British compromise 
with the EEC proposals, carefully damped 
down in order to avoid shop steward abuses 
of institutions designed for more stolid, 
tranquil and disciplined Germans. By the 
time everything arrives at the bottom, 
a s s u m in g  th a t  Mr C a l la g h a n ’ s 
administration is still there waiting to 
legislate, the outcome will be one more 
example of that dithering equivocation 
which has, in the days since 1964, become the 
hallmark of Labor governments when 
pressed for serious social reform. Indeed, the 
talk-down escalator has been a classic piece 
of Wilsonism. In mutiny against Ted Heath, 
the TUC arrived at some radical ideas. 
Restored to office, Mr. Wilson bought time. 
The names of a Commission were listed. Four 
or five of them were liable to sympathise with 
the original proposals. One or two would be 
willing to compromise, given only a hint of 
goodwill. The rest would be hostile. The 
compromise agreed, one of its instigators 
would bale out, leaving the Committee with a 
verbal commitment to the key issues of 
parity and accountability, and the 
government with a vast amount of scope for 
subsequent dilution.
But it might be the active trade unionists 
who speak the last words, when all this 
argument winds to its conclusion.
